Clearview AI victorious on a fact specific exemption but what does this judgment mean for the extra territorial effect of the UK GDPR, in particular Article 3(2)(b)?
(Clearview AI Inc v The Information Commissioner [2023] UKFTT 00819 (GRC))
Summary
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What is Clearview AI?
Clearview is a private US-based company that at the date of the ICO decision provided a facial recognition platform exclusively for non-UK/EU criminal law enforcement and national security agencies. Clearview's online database has more than 20 billion images of people's faces and data from publicly available information on the internet and social media platforms all over the world (which the ICO claimed, and Clearview accepted, is likely to include a substantial amount of the personal data of UK residents given the high number of UK internet and social media users).
The Clearview service allows their customers to upload an image of a person to Clearview's app, (the "Probe Image") which is then checked for a match against all the images in the database. The app then provides a list of images that have similar characteristics with the photo provided by the customer, with a link to the websites which were the source of those images. However, those individuals "probed" are not informed that their images were being collected or used in this way.
Background
Clearview does not offer its services to UK organisations; nevertheless, on 18 May 2022, the ICO issued to Clearview an MPN in the amount of £7,552,800 million for processing personal data in breach of UK GDPR and an EN ordering them:
The ICO concluded that as Clearview has customers in other countries and the company is using personal data of UK residents to provide services to them, the UK GDPR applied on the basis of the application of Article 3(2)(b) which provides (emphasis added):-
"This Regulation applies to the relevant processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the United Kingdom by a controller or processor not established in the United Kingdom where the processing activities are related to: … (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the United Kingdom."
On 20 June 2022, Clearview challenged the ICO's decisions, disputing the ICO's characterisation of the service provided by Clearview and its jurisdiction to issue the notices.
Note that as the relevant period covered by the notices straddled the BREXIT transition period, the legal position was governed by the GDPR and the UK GDPR (post transition period). However, for the purposes of this article we shall focus on UK GDPR (the underlying rationale for the decision is the same for both GDPR and UK GDPR).
The Judgment
The Tribunal was asked to consider whether Clearview's service fell within the territorial scope of the UK GDPR (with GDPR "the Regulations"). The Tribunal set out the questions it had to address as follows:
1. As a matter of law, could Article (3)(2)(b) UK GDPR (see above for the wording) apply where the monitoring of behaviour is carried out by a third party (i.e. the foreign law enforcement agency) rather than the data controller?
The Tribunal concluded that it could apply.
2. As a matter of fact, did the processing of personal data by Clearview relate to monitoring by either Clearview itself or by its client's?
The Tribunal concluded that as a matter of fact the processing of data by Clearview was related to the monitoring of behaviour by Clearview's clients – Clearview was not itself monitoring the behaviour of the data subjects in question.
3. Does the processing by Clearview fall outside UK GDPR as a result of the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) UK GDPR and/or otherwise not "relevant processing" for the purposes of Article 3(2)(b) UK GDPR. If so UK GDPR would not apply to the processing in question? UK GDPR provides in relevant part (emphasis added):
The effect of Article 3(2A) when read with Article 2(1)(a) UK GDPR is that the processing described in Article 2(1)(a) is excluded from the scope of Article 3(2)(b). This mirrors the position under GDPR (Article 2(2)(a)). Included within the types of processing thus excluded is the processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes.
As a result, the Tribunal concluded that the processing by Clearview fell outside the scope of UK GDPR (and GDPR) as it is not "relevant processing" for the purposes of Article 3(2)(b) UK GDPR..
Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that the ICO did not have jurisdiction to issue the notices because:
Additional Considerations
In its judgment, the Tribunal also shed light on some other points that have wider application, especially for data matching services.
Meaning of "Joint Controller" – A company offering services like Clearview, could be considered a joint controller with its clients where both determine the purposes and means of processing. In this case, Clearview was a joint controller with its clients because it imposed restrictions on how clients could use the services (i.e., limited to matters of law enforcement and national security) and determined the means of processing when matching the search image against Clearview's facial recognition database.
Commentary
Clearview's successful appeal from the ICO decision turns on the question whether all the processing it carries out is processing related to the monitoring of behaviour by foreign law enforcement agencies which is exempt from the application of UK GDPR and GDPR. In one sense this is a case specific question of fact which might in itself not be a significant development in the law (and may even be short-lived if the ICO is successful in its appeal). Without such a fact specific exemption, the processing of publicly available data of people in the UK for the purpose of monitoring their behaviour falls within the scope of the UK GDPR.
What is perhaps of greater interest in this judgment is what it could mean for the commercial use of large-scale identifying databases by non-UK companies that do not have Clearview's client base (i.e. foreign law enforcement). In this case, the Tribunal (and the ICO) made a broad assumption that Clearview's database contained UK data on the basis that it involved scraping the global internet and social media. As such, there is a risk now that any non-UK company that relies upon data from a company that could include data identifying UK residents could be subject to the UK GDPR merely by the nature of its use of the Internet and/or social media. Further, this judgment makes clear that a controller or processor may be caught by the extra-territorial scope of the UK GDPR on the basis that its processing activities relate to the monitoring of the behaviour of data subjects in the UK, even where that entity is not itself monitoring data subjects, but where its activities enable its customers to conduct such monitoring. This arguably represents a significant extension in the extra- territorial reach of UK GDPR and will increase the compliance burden on such companies as well as their clients.